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N 1890, Congress enacted the first of the statutes now commonly
,,3 referred to as the antitrust laws.' While the oldest of these
laws, the Sherman Act,2 is 80 years old this year, formal voluntary
compliance programs as we know them today are of relatively re-
cent vintage. Undoubtedly,
THE AUTHOR: MuRmRY S. MONROE this can be attributed to a num-
(B.E. and B.S., Yale University; LL.B., ber of factors. Certainly in
University of Pennsylvania) is a mem-
ber of the Ohio Bar and a practicing the late 19th and early 20th
attorney in Cincinnati, Ohio. centuries the reach of the anti-
trust laws, by 1970 standards,
was unpredictable. It took years for the courts to sketch out even
the broad parameters of some of the offenses which are now viewed
as almost illegal per se.3 While observance of the antitrust laws
was warranted, the need for formal voluntary compliance programs
was certainly not self-evident to most companies in the early years
following their enactment. In addition, acceptance of the under-
lying philosophy of the antitrust laws was not universal, and the
tendency was to interpret them in their narrowest form.4 The
* This article is based on a speech made at the Fourth Annual Antitrust Institute
of the Ohio State Bar Association on May 14, 1970, and at the Intensified Course in Anti-
trust Law, Ohio Legal Center, on June 19, 1970. The author wishes to acknowledge
the valuable comments and assistance of Charles Sawyer, Esq., and G. David Schiering,
Esq., in the preparation of this article.
IThe antitrust laws include: the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), enacted
in 1890; the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964), enacted in 1914; and, section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), also enacted in 1914.
The antitrust laws were designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition, while at the same time providing
an environment conducive to the preservation of democratic political and social institu-
tions. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). The historical background of the Sherman Act is pre-
sented in Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L REV. 743 (1950).
3 See generally W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST AcT (1965); Turner, The Definition of Agreement under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655,
656 (1962).
4 See Van Cise, The Proklems and Procedures of Counsel in Advising on Compli-
ance with the Antitrust Laws, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 221, 222, 227 (1960).
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National Industrial Recovery Act,5 passed in the 1930's, encour-
aged practices which were antithetical to the purposes of the anti-
trust laws, and compromised their aims. 6 To a lesser extent, the
aims of the antitrust laws were further compromised in later years
when various Chief Executives and Congressmen referred to them
as being out of date and unintelligible.7 Needless to say, this at-
mosphere was not conducive to the adoption of self-regulating vol-
untary compliance programs.
By 1959, however, it had become evident that voluntary compli-
ance was a matter of self-preservation to a corporation. In that
year Judge Underwood, in United States v. McDonough Co.,8 sen-
tenced four corporate executives to 90 days in jail for violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The proclivity of this kind of case
for personal tragedy was illustrated, albeit in an uncommonly
graphic manner, when one of those executives took his life on his
way to serve his sentence.9 To American businessmen the decision
brought about a shocking awareness that executives with otherwise
impeccable records can serve jail sentences, and that, for large and
small companies alike, antitrust was real and not something to be
ignored.
The McDonough case was only the beginning, however, and in
1961 the importance of voluntary compliance was reemphasized.
Federal grand juries in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted
most of the leading manufacturers of electrical equipment for price
fixing.10 The cases were so aggravated that many of the defendants
ultimately entered guilty pleas. Again, jail sentences were imposed
5 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
6The Act entrusted trade regulation to councils of cooperating businessmen
whose decisions received only administrative review. The Act was declared unconsti-
tutional in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The
National Recovery Administration was terminated in 1935. Exec. Order No. 7252,
Dec. 21, 1935, reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-12 (1964). See Levin, Status of the
Antitrust Laws Under the N.I.R.A., 2 FED. B. ASS'N J. 75 (1934).
7 See Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act - Thirty Years Thereafter, 30 ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 9, 10 (1966); Votan, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion,
24 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 14, 16-24 (1964); Withrow, Making Compliance Pro-
grams IWork, 17 Bus. LAW. 877, 878 n.1 (1962).
On March 11, 1969, House and Senate bills were introduced to establish a Com-
mission on Revision of the Antitrust Laws. See Rockefeller, Developments in Federal
Antitrust Legislation 91st Congress, 38 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION 547, 551 (1969).
8 180F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Ohio 1959).
9 TIME, Dec. 21, 1959, at 76.
10 For a discussion of the cases, commonly referred to as the Electrical Equipment
Cases, see Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy I, & II, FORTUNE, April & May,
1961, at 132 & 161 respectively.
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and served."- The Department of Justice again made it clear that
antitrust violations by large and small corporations alike would no
longer be tolerated.' 2 The 1,880 civil treble damage suits that fol-
lowed 3 accentuated the need for antitrust compliance.
Further incentive for voluntary compliance can be gathered from
a review of the antitrust laws themselves. The penalties that may be
imposed on a party for a violation of the statutes are extensive, ex-
pansive, and expensive. The penalties that may be imposed include
not only the fines,' 4 jail sentences, 15 and treble damage suits,' 6 pre-
viously observed, but also civil decrees with aggravating day-to-day
compliance problems, 7 loss of patents, 8 invalidation of contracts, 9
11 The indictments led to conviction of 29 manufacturers, fines of nearly $2 million,
and jail sentences for 30 of the manufacturers' employees for violations of the Sherman
Act. Application of State of Cal. to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp. 37
(E.D. Pa. 1961). See also J. FULLER, THE GENTLm&N CONSplAToRs 100-32 (1962);
Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy 11, supra note 10, at 222.12 As stated by the then acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice:
It should now be clear that a deliberate or conscious violation of the anti-
trust laws is not a mere personal peccadillo or economic eccentricity, but a
serious offense against society which is as immoral as any other act that injures
many in order to profit a few ... Those who are apprehended in such acts
are, and will be treated as, criminals and will personally be subjected to as
severe a punishment as we can persuade the courts to impose. Recent Develop-
ments in Antitrust Enforcement, Address by Lee Loevinger, delivered to the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Apr. 7,
1961.
See alsq Curtis, Pursuit of Happiness Under The Antitrust Laws: Corporate Planning
to Preserve Liberty and Property, 7 ANMTRUsT BULL 97,98 (1962).
Is Fora breakdown of the 1,880 treble damage suits, see Neal & Goldberg, The
Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621
(1964). Civil treble damage suits may be brought by any person, for any violation
of the antitrust laws, under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
14 Sections 1-3 of the Sherman Act provide for a maximum fine of $50,000 for each
offense. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). Fines may be imposed even if a plea of nolo con-
tendere is entered by the defendant. See United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 20
F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
15 The Sherman Act provides for a maximum jail sentence of I year for each offense.
15 U.S.C. H8 1-3 (1964). Jail sentences may be imposed even if a plea of nolo con-
tendere is entered by the defendant. See United States v. McDonough Co., 180 F.
Supp. 511 (S.D. Ohio 1959).
16Treble damage suits under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964),
are a recognized means of enforcing the antitrust laws. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946). A judgment for approximately $29 million was rendered
in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 79,435
(E.D. Pa.), and attorneys' fees of approximately $4 million were awarded. One com-
pany paid over $200 million in settlement of treble damage claims arising out of the
Electrical Equipment cases. Sayre, Developments in Multiple Treble Damage Act Liti-
gation - Introduction, 1966 ANTIsr L SYM. 46,52.
17 See In re Lorillard Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 75,049 (4th Cir.); United States v.
American Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
I8 United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953). Antitrust
19703
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loss of statutory rights,2" mandatory sales to unwanted accounts,2
divestiture of assets, 22 and numerous others. 21 In addition, crucial
government regulations already lie in the legislative wings - some
treble damage payments are not deductible under the Tax Reform Act
of 1969,24 and the limits of fines which may be imposed will probably
be increased from $50,000 to $500,000.21 If the business commu-
nity does not police itself, the possibility increases that Congress will
seek to directly regulate business.
It should be emphasized, however, that fear is not the only, or
perhaps the best, reason for instituting a voluntary compliance pro-
gram. The antitrust laws have been part of our economic philos-
ophy for 80 years. As such, good citizenship dictates voluntary
compliance if for no other reason than to help preserve our competi-
tive free enterprise system - the basis of the American economy.
Notwithstanding an individual corporate executive's differing eco-
violations may also result in the patentee's being unable to enforce his patent against
alleged infringers. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1943).
But the court might enter an interlocutory decree against future infringement upon
proof that the patentee had terminated its illegal antitrust practices. Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Sylvania Indus. Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1943).
19 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1946); Con-
tinental Wallpaper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909). See Associ-
ated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820
(1965). But see Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1959), where a seller was
permitted to recover the price of the merchandise sold even though he had violated
the antitrust laws. The Court stated:
Past the point where the judgment of the Court would itself be enforcing the
precise conduct made unlawful by the Act, the courts are to be guided by the
overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, "of preventing people
from getting other people's property for nothing when they purport to be buy-
ing it."
20A manufacturer who had entered illegal price maintenance agreements with its
dealers was temporarily barred from entering into contracts normally protected under
the fair trade laws. Lenox, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5
18,324 (FTC 1968).
21 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
2 2 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
23 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 31 (1964), which denies a violator the right to use the
Panama Canal.
24The Tax Reform Act provides that in addition to the disallowance of deduc-
tions for damages paid to the federal government, two-thirds (the penal portion) of all
treble damage payments incurred from violations where intent has been proved in a
criminal proceeding are not deductible. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (g). The pro-
vision is effective for all amounts paid or incurred after 1969.
2 5 See 38 U.S.L.W. 2655 (June 9, 1970). The bills are S. 3036, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969), and H.R. 14116, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). An increase in the maxi-
mum fine had been recommended in the REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIV-
rTY AND COMPETITION, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,250, at 55,521-22
(1969).
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nomic views, the lawyer has an ethical duty to support the antitrust
laws and voluntary compliance therewith. This is the kind of job
which can easily be put off. It should not be.
There are three basic requisites to the effective implementation
of a voluntary compliance program, all of which must be satisfied
in order to make the program work. First, the foundation must be
laid. Corporate management must be informed and convinced of
the need and benefits of the program, with a willingness to support
it. Second, key personnel must be informed and educated. They
must be educated about those areas of potential antitrust violations
within their control. This educational program must be followed
up. There should be periodic refresher courses and a procedure
to ascertain whether the program is being carried out effectively.
Third, new procedures must be adopted, commensurate with the
program, to minimize the risk of future antitrust liability. These
points are discussed in that order below.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPANY POLICY
The cardinal principle in any voluntary compliance program is
that it must be accepted in letter and spirit by the top management
of the company. 6 High sounding but empty phrases, and docu-
ments backed up only by a desire not to be caught redhanded in
the act, will do little, if anything, to protect the company or man-
agement. The Government will look behind a compliance program
and may even take the cynical attitude that some evil lurks behind
it - otherwise it would not have been instituted.17  For the pro-
gram to be successful, management must be totally committed to
the free enterprise system as the way to carry on business.
Counsel can perform a real service in convincing management
of the need for voluntary compliance. He can point out the prob-
lems of not having such a program. He can structure the program
so that it is fair and applies evenly - not merely as a protection for
2 6 See Birdzell, What Cat Be Done To Minimize Danger of Antitrust Litigation?
Preventive Measures, Handling Government Investigations and The Roles of Corpo-
rate Counsel and Outside Counsel, 38 ABA ANTITRUST SECrION 126, 127 (1969);
Curtis, supra note 12, at 99-100; Galgay, Corporate Plans and Policies for Voluntary
Antitrust Compliance, 19 Bus. LAW. 637, 639 (1964); Gavin, The Educational Func-
tion of a Corporate Legal Department, 16 Bus. LAW. 370, 371-72 (1961); Van Cise,
supra note 4, at 236-37; Van Cise, Mechanics of Compliance, in How TO COMPLY
WiTH THE ANInTR sT LAws 331, 334-35 (J. Van Cise & C. Dunn eds. 1954); Whit-
ing, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive II, 48 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1962); With-
row, supra note 7, at 877-78.
2 7 Galgay, supra note 26, at 638-39; Whiting, supra note 26, at 16.
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top management.2 Much resistence arises because the law is
thought to be uncertain and unclear.2  The most troublesome area
- the per se offenses - is dear,30 and counsel should have little
difficulty conveying this to management. Above all, counsel should
avoid undermining the antitrust laws by referring to them as fool-
ish, unintelligible, or uncertain. Such comments breed a lack of
respect for the laws and suggest that they can be avoided.
Once management has accepted the concept of voluntary com-
pliance, the mechanics of drafting and adopting the policy are not
difficult. It should be adopted in writing by the company's board
of directors." It should apply to everyone, clearly state that no
intermediate employees have authority to abrogate, amend, or re-
voke the program, and provide sanctions for violations. Distribu-
tion should be carefully reviewed by counsel so that it is sent to
every employee who has any reasonable chance of being involved
in the matters covered by the program. This will include all em-
2 8 Withrow, supra note 7, at 882.
2 9 See id.; Van Cise, How to Live with Antitrust, 40 HARV. Bus. REv. 119 (1962).
30 Special Subcommittee of Sherman Act Committee, The Per Se Rule, 38 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 731 (1969). The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division has stated that the Division views the following six practices as
illegal per se: agreements not to compete, collusive price fixing, market division agree-
ments, group boycotts, some tie-in agreements, and the pooling of profits and losses
by competitors. Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 19 ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 245, 247-49 (1961).
3 1 The following is a suggested policy, which is based on policies actually used by
various companies with which the author has dealt.
POLICY
It is the Policy of the Company to comply strictly in all respects with the
antitrust laws. There shall be no exception to this Policy nor shall it be com-
promised or qualified by anyone acting for or on behalf of the Company.
No employee shall enter into any understanding, agreement, plan or
scheme, expressed or implied, formal or informal, with any competitor, in
regard to prices, terms or conditions of sale, production, distribution, territories
or customers; nor exchange or discuss with a competitor prices, terms or con-
ditions of sale or any other competitive information; nor engage in any other
conduct which in the opinion of the Company's counsel violates any of the
antitrust laws.
Any clear infraction of the applicable laws or of recognized ethical business
standards will subject an employee to disciplinary action, which may include
reprimand, probation, suspension, reduction in salary, demotion or dismissal
- depending on the seriousness of the offense. Clear-cut price-fixing or bid-
rigging acts or illegal activities with competitors to divide or allocate markets
or customers will result in dismissal.
In addition, disciplinary measures will apply to any superior executive who
directs or approves of such actions, or has knowledge of them and does not
move promptly to correct them in accordance with this Guide. Appropriate
disciplinary measures also will apply to any superior executive who fails to
carry out his management responsibility to insure that employees affected by
the Guide are adequately informed about the corporate policy on legal and
ethical conduct.
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ployees whose duties bring them into contact with prices, costs, or
competitive matters, or expose them to contracts with competitors.
The policy probably should be distributed periodically with a cover-
ing letter from the chief executive officer to put the emphasis in its
proper perspective. The recipient should be required to acknowl-
edge receipt of the policy statement3 2
III. EDUCATION OF COMPANY PERSONNEL
Once the foundation for antitrust compliance has been estab-
lished and the administrative details have been worked out, it is
necessary to educate the personnel of the company about the policy
and the applicable law. This is necessary to help the company
regulate its own conduct and recognize antitrust problems in time
to obtain legal advice. The education process breaks down into
four areas of discussion: (1) what should be covered; (2) who
should explain it; (3) how should it be done; and (4) checking the
results.
A. What Should Be Covered
The degree of antitrust familiarization to be attained by a par-
ticular client's personnel will naturally vary with the client's busi-
ness operations. To explore all the possible antitrust violations
and attempt to relate them to even a few industries would unduly
extend this article. As a result, only the major considerations will
be discussed and then only briefly.'
3
(1) The most important point is that the corporate client should
exercise independent judgment and act independently in making its
decisions.34 It should be wary of any agreement or concerted ac-
tivity with a competitor 35 Certain practices should be absolutely
prohibited. The most obvious of these are the following:
32 Curtis, supra note 12, at 101.
3 3 A general summary of the antitrust laws can be found in Bloom, A Guide to
Antitrust, 20 BUs. LAw. 61 (1964). While this summary is very general and occa-
sionally out of date, it will give the layman a basic feel for the antitrust laws. New
developments can be reviewed annually in the ABA Antitrust Section. See, e.g., Burrus
& Savarese, Developments in Antitrust During the Past Year, 38 ABA ANTimUsT
SECTION 323 (1969). An excellent discussion of the more pervasive violations appears
in the report of the Special Subcommittee of Sherman Act Committee, supra note 30.
34 Freedman, Antitrust: The Education of a Client, 17 BUS. LAW. 321, 324 (1962).
The decision may even have to be independent of the wishes and desires of entities
which are commonly owned. Compare Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968), with Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian
Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1969).
3 5 Certain activities may be carried on in cooperation with a competitor. Fre-
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(a) Price Fixing.- Price fixing agreements are illegal re-
gardless of whether the prices fixed are maximum or minimum, 36
reasonable or unreasonable,8 7 temporary or permanent. 8  The same
rule applies to terms of sale, freight allowances, quantity discounts,
and other elements of price. 9 The amount of interstate or foreign
trade involved is immaterial. 40
(b) Division of Customers or Markets.- Any agreement
among competitors to divide territories geographically, allocate cus-
tomers, divide markets by fields of use, or otherwise not to compete
for any one or more customers is generally considered to be perni-
cious under the antitrust laws and incapable of legal justification.41
(c) Boycotts.- Any agreement with a competitor not to
deal with another party whether a supplier, customer, or otherwise
is illegal in and of itself.42
quently this is done under the auspices of a trade association. For a discussion of per-
missible activities of this nature, see Hoffman, Industry-Wide Codes, Advertising, Seals
of Approval and Standards: As Participated in by the Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 595 (1968); Hummel, Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes of Advertising,
Standardization, and Seals of Approval, 13 AN.musT BULL. 607 (1968); Margolis,
Recent Developments in Trade Regulation Law Relating to Trade Associations, 13
ANTITRusT BULL. 539 (1968); Miron, Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Busi-
ness Information, 10 ANnTRUST BULL. 485 (1965); Wachtel, Products Standards and
Certification Programs, 13 ANnTRUST BULL. 1 (1968). See also text accompanying
notes 86-88 infra.
36 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Serta Associates,
Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 534, rehearing
denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969).
37 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
38 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v.
Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository
v. Christianson, 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Bakersfield Associ-
ated Plumbing Contractors, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 74,296 (S.D. Cal.). See United States
v. New Orleans Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 33
(E.D. La. 1966), aft'd, 396 U.S. 115 (1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 1063 (1970).
Stabilization of prices, even in a downward trend, is unlawful. United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
A possible exception to the per se rule exists if a patent license with a competitor
is involved. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926). See
also United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
39 See FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No. 97, reprinted in [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,727 (Oct. 19, 1966); FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No.
281, reprinted in [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,483 (Aug. 27,
1968). See also United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
40 United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
41United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timkin Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
386 (1945); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United
States v. Serta Associates, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (N.D. fI1. 1968), afj'd per
curiam, 393 U.S. 534, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969). But see United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd on o/her grounds,
351 U.S. 377 (1956).
42 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Radiant Burners,
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(d) Restrictions on Production.- Similarly, agreements
with competitors to limit or divide production fall within the per se
category of illegality.43
(2) The second point is that, like agreements with competitors,
certain agreements with customers or suppliers are or nearly are per
se restraints of trade. Vertical price maintenance agreements are
illegal per se where there is no applicable fair trade statute.44 Re-
strictions as to the customers to which distributors may resell,43
tie-in sales,46 and the payment of commissions to persons acting for
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941). In exceptional cases, the per se rule has not been applied to a
boycott. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Deesen v. Professional
Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
See generally Turner, supra note 3, at 684-705.
4 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). See also United States v.
American Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). However, trade
association programs to standardize products have been upheld even though the result
may be to eliminate or reduce the production of nonstandard products. Structural
Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966), affd
per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
44 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 393 (1911). Ef-
forts to achieve a similar result by refusing to deal with price cutters have been
notoriously unsuccessful. See United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
But see Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cit. 1963). Simi-
larly, the use of consignment contracts as a method to fix prices of a number of retail
dealers has been held to be illegal. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
Ohio's fair trade statute was held constitutional in Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v.
Ontario Store of Price Hill, Ohio, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 2d 67, 223 N.E.2d 592 (1967).
45 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v.
Glaxo Group, Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969). Courts have indicated there may
be some exceptions to the per se rule. See Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136 nA (1968); Tripoli Co., Inc. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d
932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3147 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970); Janel Sales Corp. v.
Lanvin Parfuns, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1969).
46 Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Han-
over Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The traditional
tying arrangement involves two distinct products which are being tied together by
means of the supplier's power over one of the products. In recent years, the law has
been gradually expanded to reach tie-ins involving less distinct products and less ex-
plicit restraints. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th
Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cart. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965). The tie-in need not be
express and may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, including such things
as the seller's economic dominance over the buyer's business. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,
393 U.S. 223 (1968). Unjustifiably large discounts on combination purchases, and
presumably other substantial economic incentives to buy a second product, may also pro-
duce a de facto tie-in. See Advanced Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM, supra', Amer-
ican Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc., 388 F.2d
272, 283 (2d Cir. 1967). In addition, it is no longer necessary that the same seller be
the source of the tying and tied product, at least where the seller of the tying product
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a buyer 7 are virtually illegal per se. Also suspect, albeit less so,
are exclusive dealing and requirements contracts,4 reciprocal buy-
ing,4" and full line forcing.50 Finally, the termination of distribu-
tors should be handled with care,5 ' particularly when another dis-
tributor has prompted the action.52
receives a commission on the sale of the tied product. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286
F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
Although tie-in sales are frequently termed illegal per se, courts have upheld them
in special situations. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); Baker v. Simmons Co.,
307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d
653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also Carvel
Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,298 (FTC 1965) (dis-
missal order).
See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1967); Hoerner, Some Issues in Tying and Exclusive Dealing, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 233
(1969); Note, The Logic of Forecosure: Tie-in Doctrine After Fortner v. U.S. Steel,
79 YALE L.J. 86 (1969).
47Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964). See FTC v. Henry
Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960); Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d
67 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964). Discounts granted directly to a
buyer stand on a firmer footing since they violate section 2(c) only if they are directly
attributable to the elimination of the illegal commission. See Empire Rayon Yarn Co.,
Inc. v. American Viscoe Corp., 354 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated, 364 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Central Retailer-Owned Grocers,
Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541
(5th Cir. 1962). For an excellent discussion of section 2(c), see Mezines, Brokerage
- When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman Act?, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 821 (1966).
4 8 See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S.
392 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also Hoerner,
supra note 46.
49 California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C.
67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931). See also FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
50 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d
832 (4th Cir. 1960). But see United States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 867 (D.
Minn. 1951).
51 Compare Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cit. 1964); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Metropolitan Dry Cleaning Mach. Co. v. Washex Mach. Corp.,
1969 Trade Cas. 86,438 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), with Bell v. Speed Queen, 407 F.2d 1022
(7th Cir. 1969); Amplex v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968); B & B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293
F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Potter's Photographic Application Co. v. Ealing Corp.,
292 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). For an informative discussion of the question, see
Donaldson & Howe, Selection of Distributors and Dealers, 38 U. CIN. L REv. 228,
231-32 (1968).
52 Compare Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), with Girardi v. Gates Rubber
Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963) and Hub Auto Supply, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co., 173 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mass. 1959).
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(3) Next, discrimination in the prices and services given to a
customer must be considered. The Robinson-Patman Act, 53 how-
ever, is so complicated that no amount of education will adequately
prepare a client to deal with problems of discrimination. Detailed
knowledge of the company's operation and the industry are neces-
sary to give reliable advice. Nevertheless, the client should be made
aware of the problems inherent in giving different purchasers differ-
ent treatment on the same or substantially the same goods, and he
should be instructed to consult his attorney before engaging in such
practices. "
(4) As to acquisitions and mergers, the client ordinarily will
consult his attorney before he enters into an agreement to buy an-
other business. Because of this, it probably will not be necessary
to educate the client in detail about section 7 of the Clayton Act.55
However, some education is in order, if for no other reason than
to allow the client time to think about some of the more esoteric
aspects of the antimerger laws before he is directly faced with
them.56
(5) It should be emphasized that an agreement need not be
signed in blood in order to constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws.5 7  Salesmen should be disabused of any notion that they can
skirt liability by remaining silent at a price fixing meeting and by
retaining a firm but unspoken mental reservation about "going
along." One salesman told me that his company was not in jeop-
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964). The Act is reviewed in considerable detail
in a series of recent articles. See Antitrust Problems in the Sale and Distribution of
Goods, 37 ABA A~nTRUsT SncnoN 1 (1968). The businessman can find an extremely
helpful explanation of the Robinson-Patman Act in E. KntIMER, A ROBINSON-
PATMAN PRIMER (1970).
54 See Freedman, supra note 34, at 326.
r5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
56 See Hale, Preventive Law: Experience in the Antitrust Field, 38 S. CAL. L. REV.
391, 394-95 (1965). An excellent discussion of recent developments in merger prob-
lems is presented in Burrus & Savarese, supra note 33, at 359-409.
57 See Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S.
700 (1969) (per curiam), rev'g 404 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1968). ":R]ead in light of
last year's Albrecht [390 U.S. 145 (1968)] decision . . . [Norfolk Monument] leads
one to speculate whether the specter of conscious parallelism may not have been re-
vived." Handler, Some Comments on Selected Current Rulings and The Burning Is-
sues of the Day, 38 ABA ANTIRUST SECTION 574, 593 (1969). In Esco Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1965), the court stated that "[a] knowing
wink can mean more than words." See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939);
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958), afI'd, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); Turner, supra
note 3. But see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
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ardy because he had never been "committed" to any of the prices
he had discussed with his competitors and because he fully intended
to cut the prices immediately after the discussions. He carefully
added that he would not have agreed to any prices because that was
illegal. Naturally, the result was disastrous for his employer.
(6) The employees should be warned against participation in
"rump" sessions at trade association meetings58 or, for that matter,
attendance at any meetings of competitors who are known to en-
gage in questionable activity.59
(7) The client should also be advised to avoid engaging in
practices which may create the appearance of evil and which may be
misconstrued. 0 The exchange of price lists and cost data by com-
petitors can cause undesirable inferences. 61 Surreptitious telephone
calls from unlisted numbers and memos mailed from unusual places
in unmarked envelopes can only magnify the problem.02 In a less
bizarre context, it has been held that the exchange of trade statistics
is more likely to be justifiable if it is done openly and the results
are made available to all, rather than only to competitors.63
(8) A short course in writing is also in order.0 4 Salesmen
5 8 See Withrow, supra note 7, at 884-85.
59 Mere membership in an association coupled with actual or constructive knowl-
edge that others are acting unlawfully may be the basis for a finding of liability.
Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1943). But see Vander-
velde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 43 F.R.D. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
60 See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Tag
Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 463-65 (1st Cir. 1949); Freedman, supra note
34, at 326-27. But see American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 256 U.S.
377 (1921).
61 See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Cement Mfrs. Protec-
tive Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). The exchange of data about current
or past prices and costs has been sanctioned in specific cases wherein the court found
that it was not done to raise prices. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563 (1925); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950); United States v. National Malleable & Steel Casting
Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 73,582 (N.D. Ohio). However, the difficulty of meeting that
standard raises serious questions about the wisdom of such exchanges, except under the
most limited and controlled circumstances. Compare FTC Advisory Opinion Digest
No. 162, reprinted in [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,168 (Jan.
27, 1968), with United States v. FMC Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5
73,258 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1970) and FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No. 359, reprinted
in [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,844 (July 11, 1969).
62United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1968 Trade Cas. 76,759 (E.D. Pa.);
see J. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS 74 (1962). A corporate executive
can, of course, be individually convicted on the basis of "personal" correspondence and
records found in the corporate files. United States v. Consumers Ice Co., 84 F. Supp.
46 (W.D. La. 1949).
6 3 See cases cited note 60 supra.
64 See Loughlin, The Naughty Words of Antitrust, 54 A.B.A.J. 246 (1968).
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frequently write unfortunate memos. A letter which referred to
prices of "the entire industry" and to attempts to "stabilize the in-
dustry" was found to be strong evidence of a conspiracy. 65 A letter
which ended 'please destroy" was extremely damaging to defend-
ants.6" This principle applies equally at the executive level. An-
nual reports, proxy statements, and government filings should all
be scrutinized for adverse antitrust implications.
(9) Personnel should be advised about how to handle requests
from government agents for interviews or information.6 8 They
should be instructed that upon such a request the lawyer should be
notified first and the matter referred to him.
(10) It is extremely helpful to explain the principles and
purpose of the antitrust laws and perhaps some of their history.69
Only then will the law be put into proper context and its broader
implications become apparent to the employees. They probably
will remember this information for a longer period than specific
violations. Undoubtedly, a dear understanding of the purpose of
the antitrust laws will help to avoid unwitting violations at a later
date.
B. Who Should Conduct the Educational Program
Obviously, the educational program requires that someone with
a detailed knowledge of antitrust law do the teaching. However,
it also requires a more than general familiarity with the client's
business - the problems are most effectively handled in the context
of actual situations which are familiar to the employees. The logi-
65 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 907 (1963).
66 Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 1965); see Casket
Mfrs. Ass'n, 52 F.T.C. 958, 969 (1956); Beckstrom, Destruction of Documents with
Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 687 (1966).
6 7 The definition of a submarket for purposes of antimerger laws was decided ad-
versely on the basis of "puffing" in annual reports. Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d
928 (6th Cir. 1970).
68 See Bernhard, Uncovering Violations of the Antitrust Laws: From Grand Jury
Subpoena to Civil Investigative Demand, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 34 (1955); Davis,
Investigation by the Department of Justice - As Seen by the Potential Defendant, 29
ABA ANnTRusT SECTION 54 (1965); Hoffmann, Meeting Government Antitrust In-
vestigations, 3 ANnTRUST BULL. 293 (1958); Nitschke, Procedure in Antitrust Investi-
gations, 1950 U. ILL. L. REV. 593; Withrow & Litvack, The Antitrust Civil Process Act
Or the Problems of the Civil Investigative Demand, 20 BUS. LAw. 5 (1964).
69 See Steadman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L.
REV. 197; Seventy-five Years of the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 1
(1965); Fifty Years of the FTC and Clayton Acts, 24 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 14
(1964); The Robinson-Paiman Act - Retrospect and Prospect, 17 ABA ANTITRUST
SEcnON 295 (1960).
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cal choice is house counsel. 70  If the job falls to outside counsel, he
should familiarize himself with the company's antitrust history, its
distribution system, how its prices are set, its membership in trade
associations, and other pertinent information. It is doubtful that the
job can be effectively delegated to a layman or that the message
can be disseminated through "channels."
C. How Should It Be Done
It is important that personnel of the company at all levels know
the company policy, that management fully endorses it, and that
violations will not be tolerated. It is basically management's job
to accomplish these results. The issuance of the policy bulletin by
itself will not do the job. Followup and repetition are vital. In
addition, actual imposition of sanctions for violations is probably
the best manner in which to establish the firmness of management's
position.71
It is counsel's job to educate company personnel about the details
of the applicable law. 'While a general education program is im-
portant, it is neither possible nor desirable to make antitrust lawyers
out of businessmen. Counsel should probably limit itself to giving
the black letter rules on per se violations and a general feel about
the other problem areas so that the personnel will call when they
encounter problems. A written list of the do's and don'ts is helpful.
To the extent possible, the presentation should be related to illustra-
tive examples using the company's particular industry. Do not be
afraid to parade the horribles. The presentation should be oral,
with a sufficient time allowed for questions and answers. This should
help develop an understanding of the problems. The meetings
should start with the top management and work down the corporate
hierarchy.
D. Checking the Results
It is unlikely that your message will be completely effective in
the first instance."2 It is desirable to check the results to assess the
7 0 See Gavin, supra note 26.
71 "Where an employee has engaged in unfair methods of competition, contrary
to company policy, the company's opposition to such conduct would be unmistakably
indicated by some appropriate disciplinary act." Van Cise, Mechanics of Compliance,
in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAws 331, 337 (J. Van Cise & C. Dunn
eds. 1954).
72 See J. FULLER, supra note 62.
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degree of leakage.73 While executives will only reluctantly bare their
"personal" pricing files, a review of such files will be extremely
helpful. Certainly, discussions should be held with key people.
When counsel is being consulted on a specific problem, it is often
possible to expand the discussion to cross-check some other prob-
lems. Some companies require various certificates to be filed by per-
sons who may be setting prices or meeting with competitors74 as
a means of checking compliance with the program.
7 3 See Curtis, Pursuit of Happiness Under the Antitrust Laws: Corporate Planning
to Preserve Liberty and Property, 7 ANnTRTUST BULL. 97, 109 (1962).
7 4 Suggested forms are set forth below.
Date-----------------
Division and Department Managers must execute
this Certificate within ten days of the end of
each quarter.
I have caused an investigation to be made of all prices quoted, bid, or
charged by my division, and I have satisfied myself that all prices, quoted,
bid, or charged since ------------- on the sale of products for which I
have responsibility have been determined independently by the Company's
personnel, without collusion or discussion with competitors, in accordance
with the Company's policies respecting legal and ethical conduct, and in full
compliance with the law, including antitrust and trade regulation laws.
I have personally checked the current list of persons in my division who
are required to complete Certificates respecting any contact by them with a
representative of a competitor, or any meeting attended by them at which a
representative of a competitor was present, to make sure that such list is
complete and up to date and that all persons listed thereon understand and are
complying with company policy respecting these certificates.
In addition, I have personally checked compliance by the Division with
the provisions of any Federal Court or government agency orders or decrees
which refer or relate to products or business of the Division to make sure




This Certificate must be submitted by all personnel who have authority to set
prices, or terms, or conditions of sale, following their attendance at any type
of meeting at which a representative of a competing company was present.
On ------------- I attended a meeting or gathering at ....
Date Indicate city and meeting place
for the purpose of.........................................
or to discuss - - - --------------- at which
representatives of competing companies were present. The gathering was:
Sponsored by ------------- , or Called by -------------- or Casual
or Coincidental ------------------ --- /
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IV. AVOIDING OR MINIMIZING THE RISK
Once the program has been introduced and personnel educated,
the lawyer should seek to aid his client in eliminating old proce-
dures and adopting new ones which will minimize the risk of ex-
posure to antitrust liability. The approach to this problem will
vary with each corporation, depending upon how the client operates
his business, how large the business is, and the extent to which the
business can afford to adopt certain procedures. Because of these
variables, it is difficult to be specific; however, generalizations about
a few programs are set forth below.
A. Documenting the Reasons for Business Decisions
Business decisions are often made for perfectly valid reasons,
but they can become suspect years later for lack of a record or recol-
lection which will completely establish those reasons. The most
obvious example is a contemporaneous price increase which was
necessitated by an increase in costs. 5 Another example is a price
increase which was based upon an announced increase by a com-
petitor.7 6  Years later it is always difficult to establish whether the
chicken or the egg came first - did the client receive his competi-
tor's price list and then decide to raise prices or did he decide to
..............................................................
I certify that while I was in attendance, there was no discussion (other
than set out above under "Remarks") relating to fixing prices, terms or condi-
tions of sale to be quoted, bid or charged in connection with the sale of prod-
ucts to any third party, or relating to choice of customers, or allocation of
business, or to fixing the market shares for any product or products, or relating
to any other matter inconsistent with the complete independence of the Com-
pany in its commercial activites.
I further certify that in connection with the meeting or gathering refer-
red to I did not participate in any incidental, collateral or other discussions
of any of the above matters (other than set out above under "Remarks") in
any informal gathering, "side bar discussion," "rump session," social or un-
official meeting, conference or conversation.
Type or Print Name and Title
Location Signature
75 Contemporaneous increases are justified where companies have common raw
material costs and their labor costs are standardized by union contracts. See Pevely
Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942
(1950). But see C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cit.
1952).
7 6 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See also
Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, in READINGS IN INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1958); Turner, supra note 3.
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raise prices (perhaps after talking to the competitor) and then ob-
tain the competitor's list?77 A memorandum detailing the circum-
stances may be extremely helpful. 8 A third example involves a
price cut to meet competition."9 Where the discounts have been
made to meet competition, it is important to document the details
carefully, particularly in a fluid market. 0 It is also helpful, if not
mandatory, to have available a cost study to justify any discounts
which are given because of a savings in cost.81
B. Documenting the Reasons for Contact with Competition
Price fixing cases are frequently based on circumstantial evidence.
Such evidence may consist of a meeting between competitors, gen-
eral statements that prices were mentioned at the meeting, and a
price increase shortly after the meeting. 2 Since evidence of a
meeting with competition will normally be memorialized in the
company's expense vouchers, the company should take steps to
negate unfortunate inferences arising from such a meeting. A com-
pany should require personnel who have authority to set prices to
state in writing the reasons for any contract with the competitor and
77 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir.
1958); Hale, supra note 56, at 392-93.
7 8 See Van Cise, supra note 71, at 335.
7 9 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Surprise
Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1969); Exquisite Form Brassiere,
Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962); J. VAN
CIsE, THE ROBINSON PATMAN AcT: FRED MEYER, UTAH PIE, AND OTHER COMPLI-
ANCE PROBLEMS 45-65 (1969).
8 0 See Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5
73,155 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1970); National Dairy Prods. Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,656 (FTC 1966); Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,311 (FTC 1965). But see United States v. Con-
tainer Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See generally J. VAN CISE, supra note 79, at 60-65.
8 1 The cost justification defense is provided for in section 2(a) of the Robinson-
PatmanAct, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The proviso states:
[Niothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to
such purchasers sold or delivered ....
See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); United States v. Borden Co., 370
U.S. 460 (1962); American Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Morton v. Na-
tional Dairy Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Rockefeller, Defenses of
Cost Justification and Mfeeting Competition, in J. VAN CISE, supra note 79, at 147. But
see FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) (the cost justification defense
is not available for the granting of allowances or the furnishing of services).
8 2 Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cit. 1965); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1958), aft'd, 360 U.S. 395
(1959).
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that prices were not discussed if that be the fact.83 Any such state-
ment should be written promptly after the contact. If the person
who attended the meeting cannot make such a statement unequivo-
cally, prompt remedial action should be taken under the company's
compliance policy, and that fact documented.
C. Adoption of a File Retention Policy
There is no need to store indefinitely the thousands of files
which a corporation may accumulate. The files take up valuable
space and create tremendous mechanical problems if the company
is required to search them pursuant to a court order. An analysis
should be prepared of the company's documents setting forth the
reasonable file life of each category of documents.84 Under coun-
sel's guidance, the company should probably adopt a policy which
provides for the retention of the documents during the period es-
tablished by the analysis, and which calls for routine and periodic
destruction of documents which are outside the indicated period.8"
D. Examination of Trade Association Memberships
Every corporation should undertake a thorough examination of
its trade association memberships. Such memberships unquestion-
ably raise some substantive antitrust issues. 8 In addition, they in-
crease the risk that questionable conduct outside the association
will be exposed. The corporation, with the advice of counsel,
must consider whether the benefits to be received from the associa-
83 See note 74 supra. This type of record was required by the decree entered in
United States v. FMC Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5 73,258 (E.D.
Pa. June 26, 1970). For a discussion of some permissible reasons for contact with a
competitor, see the articles cited in note 35 supra.
84 For sample record retention programs, see DIEBOLD, INC, HOW TO PLAN A
SUCCESSFUL RECORD RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION PROGRAM (1952); RECORD
CONTROLS, INC., RETENTION AND PRESERVATION OF RECORDS WITH DESTUCTION
SCHEDULES (7th ed. 1961); REMINGTON RAND, INC., A BASIC PLAN FOR RECORD
RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION.
85 Selective destruction of damaging records is not recommended. See Beckstrom,
supra note 66; Galgay, Corporate Plans and Policies for Voluntary Antitrust CoMpli-
ance, 19 Bus. LAw. 637 (1964); Hale, supra note 56.
8 6 See, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952);
United States v. New Orleans Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc.,
1969 Trade Cas. 86,571 (E.D. La. 1968); FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No. 273, re-
printed in [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,472 (Aug. 17, 1968);
Hale, supra note 56, at 393; Monroe, Practical Antitrust Considerations for Trade Associa-
tions, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 622.
87 See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 388 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968).
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tion outweigh the risks and the expenses of being a member. In
reaching such a determination certain basic questions should be
asked. These include: (1) whether there are any tangible business
benefits to be derived from the association; (2) if so, whether the
benefits are available without joining the association; (3) whether
the dues and other expenses of joining are commensurate with the
commercial benefits; (4) whether the association conducts its busi-
ness in such a manner as to minimize antitrust exposure; and (5)
what is the real motive in joining the association?88
V. CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE As
APPLIED TO A COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
One final point which deserves consideration is the attorney-
client privilege. In carrying out a program of voluntary compli-
ance, it is important for counsel and the corporate client to realize
the limited extent to which the program is protected by this privi-
lege.89
The attorney-client privilege generally prevents the disclosure
of communications between an attorney and his client where the
communications relate to legal advice sought in confidence by the
client." The privilege applies to communications between corpo-
rations and outside counsel,91 and it probably also applies to house
counsel. 2  However, if the house counsel's duties primarily in-
88 See Monroe, supra note 86, at 631-32.
89 There are a number of other rules which, in a specific situation, may protect
specific material. The most frequently cited is the work-product doctrine. See Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Monroe, Discovery and Other Pretrial Matters,
38 U. CIN. L REV. 289, 301-03 (1968). Another is the so-called joint defendant rule.
See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); Leonia Amusement Co.
v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 YALE LJ. 1030, 1032-36
(1954). A third is a privilege extended to certain confidential information. See, e.g.,
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964) (communications
between parties under joint investigation); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (communications between corporation's rearrangement
group). These doctrines and privileges deal basically with preparation for trial. As a
result, they are outside the scope of this article.
90 J. WIGMORE, EvmEwcN § 2292 (McNaughtoa rev. 1961); see Burnham, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901 (1969). Unless
waived by the client, the privilege permanently protects the communication from dis-
closure by the client or by the attorney. See Note, supra note 89. The privilege may
be withdrawn upon a showing that the lawyer's advice was intended to help his client
violate antitrust law. Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967).
91 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The applicability of the privilege in the context of de-
rivative suits is discussed in Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder's
Suits, 69 COLUML L REV. 309 (1969).
92See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 P. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950)
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volve business matters, he may lose his right to the attorney-client
privilege (and perhaps to the work-product doctrine) . In addi-
tion, the privilege does not protect the passage of preexisting docu-
ments or papers from the client to the attorney." Finally, although
communications to and from the management group of the corpora-
tion may be entitled to the privilege, it is doubtful whether com-
munications to other employees are so entitled. 5 It is doubtful
therefore that the attorney-client privilege will be applicable to the
majority of the documents and communications made in the routine
carrying out of the program.
It is always possible that documents generated by the program
to record business information will reveal a violation of the anti-
(dictum); Carson, Privilege and the Work-Product Rule in Corporate Lat' Departments,
14 BUS. LAW. 771 (1959); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corpo-
rations, 65 YALE I.J. 953 (1956); Strack, Attorney-Client Privilege - House Counsel,
12 Bus. LAW. 229 (1957).
9 8 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). But cf.
Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FCM Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
See also Simon, supra note 92, at 973-78.
9 4 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); In re Ruppert, 309 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1962); C. McCoR-
MI c, EVIENCE 188 (1954).
9 5 Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), petition for
mandamus denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). In this case the court formulated the so-
called "control group" test. The question before the court was whether the privilege
protected the lawyer's memoranda of interviews of employees - debriefing state-
ments which had been made after the employees' appearance before the grand jury.
In ruling that some of these statements were producible in pretrial proceedings, the
court held that the corporate attorney-client privilege did not protect communications
with corporate employees unless those employees had the responsibility to make the
decisions about which the lawyer was then being consulted. The court concluded that
if the employee is not in such a position of control, he does not personify the corpora-
tion and is merely a witness from whom the attorney obtained the information. The
control group test obviously severely limits the availability of the privilege to the
corporation. The court specifically rejected several other tests, one of which was that
the matter should be protected if the acts of the employee which he disclosed to the
lawyer were acts for which the corporation would be responsible. Id. at 485.
The Westinghouse decision has been followed in Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,
692 (10th Cir. 1968); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(1970 Trade Cas.) 5 73,122 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1970); Garrison v. General Motors
Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 53,
199 N.E. 2d 802 (1964). But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d
487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term renum-
bered No. 113, 1970 Term). The court, rejecting the control group test as inadequate,
found that the corporate attorney-client privilege protects communications of some cor-
porate agents who are not within the control group. In so doing, the court stated that
the privilege should apply "where the employee makes the communication at the direc-
tion of his superiors ... and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advise
is sought... and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee
of the duties of his employment." 423 F.2d at 491-92.
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
trust laws. The attorney and client should be aware that there is a
serious question as to whether the privilege applies to such a docu-
ment.96 It is mandatory that prompt remedial action be taken to
rectify the violation, and a second document should probably be
made to reflect that action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most companies need a compliance program. In some cases the
program can be relatively simple and uncomplicated, while in
others it will require more formality. What will suffice for one
company will not necessarily suffice for another. However, there
are at least two common denominators to all programs. First, it
is vital to have the program fully accepted by the top management.
Second, no matter what the form of the program, its success will
be directly proportionate to the amount of effort that is put into it
on a regular and continuous basis. As an adjunct to the compliance
program, it is appropriate to adopt other programs which will con-
serve the company's time and expense, and which may minimize its
risk of exposure. These include, among others, programs to docu-
ment important business decisions which have antitrust significance,
and a file retention program to cover the disposition of unneeded
documents.
The well-adapted compliance program will help to improve
communications between the lawyer and his client. Not only will
the client gain insight into the antitrust laws, but counsel should also
gain greater insight into the client's business and be more helpful
to him in areas other than antitrust. The adoption of such a program
should also pay dividends to the client in other ways. From the
financial point of view alone, it is much less expensive in the long
run to stay out of trouble than to incur the harsh penalties resulting
from antitrust violations.
In short, the effects of noncompliance are so harsh that the
corporate executive who is unaware of, or deliberately negligent in
observing, antitrust legislation places his corporation in continuing
jeopardy. It thus becomes important for the corporate attorney not
only to educate the ignorant, but to persuade the unwilling client that
voluntary compliance is both economical and profitable. It must be
reemphasized, however, that no compliance program can be based
96 See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see
Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
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on fear alone. It must be based on respect, understanding, and
willing observance by businessmen of the principles upon which
both the antitrust laws and the American economy were founded.
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